Something New in Substantive Review: Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Rylatt, J.W. & Tomlinson, J.P.
This is a repository copy of Something New in Substantive Review: Keyu v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/109992/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Rylatt, J.W. and Tomlinson, J.P. orcid.org/0000-0002-7385-3085 (2016) Something New in 
Substantive Review: Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 
Judicial Review, 21 (3). pp. 204-208. ISSN 1085-4681 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10854681.2016.1238608
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Judicial 
Review on 31/10/2016, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10854681.2016.1238608.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Something New in Substantive Review   1 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department  
 
Jake W. Rylatt and Joe Tomlinson 
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law and Wolfson College, University of Cambridge and 
University of Sheffield  
 
 
1. Over the past few decades, the question of substantive review has provided one of the liveliest 
debates in public law. However, despite a myriad of contributions from courts and legal 
commentators, we are still left with little certainty as to VXEVWDQWLYH UHYLHZ¶V nature, scope, 
DQG VWUXFWXUH $V ZH QHDU  \HDUV VLQFH /RUG *UHHQH¶V ODQGPDUN GHFLVLRQ LQ Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, and despite some 
interesting and innovative recent additions to the debate,1 a distinct sense of fatigue has begun 
to set in. Such weariness is evident in important recent contributions to the debate, with Paul 
Craig, for instance, bemoaning in 2010 that: 
 
³It is over 60 years since Wednesbury, and over 250 years since the advent of some form of rationality 
review in the UK. The bottom line remains that we cannot produce a modern definition of rationality 
review which is legally authoritative and where the mode of application coheres with the legal test´2 
 
Despite this weariness, the question remains as important as ever, with the answer ultimately 
defining the level of control possessed by the courts, and subsequently the executive, vis-à-vis 
the balancing of competing interests of stakeholders affected by decisions of public 
DXWKRULWLHV 6LQFH 3DXO &UDLJ¶V VWDWHPHQW LQ  WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV EHHQ DVNHG WR
grapple with the issue on a number of occasions, including in the recent judgment in Keyu v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 69, which provides the subject of 
this article. 
 
2. Keyu concerned a decision by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
not to hold a public inquiry into a series of events that took place in December 1948, when a 
Scots Guards patrol shot and killed 24 unarmed civilians in the village of Batang Kali in 
Selangor (at the time a British Protected State in the Federation of Malaya). 
 
3. The appellants contended that a public inquiry into these events, which they characterized as 
unjustified murder, was required on three different grounds: 
 
(1)8QGHUWKHµSURFHGXUDOREOLJDWLRQ¶WRLQYHVWLJDWHVXVSLFLRXVGHDWKVSXUVXDQWWR$UWLFOH
European Convention on Human Rights µ(&+5¶; 
 
(2) Under the common law, which has incorporated a duty under customary international 
law to investigate suspicious deaths; and 
 
                                                     
1
 For instance, see the contributions in Hannah Wilberg and Mark Elliott (eds.), The Scope and 
Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart's Rainbow (Hart Publishing, 2015). 
2
 3DXO &UDLJ ³3URSRUWLRQDOLW\ 5DWLRQDOLW\ DQG 5HYLHZ´ >@ 1=/5   )RU IXUWKHU IDWLJXH
with the debate around substantive review see Lord Carnwath, "From judicial outrage to sliding 
scales²where next for Wednesbury?" (ALBA Lecture, 12 November 2013).   
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(3) Under the common law, since the decision not to investigate was irrational and/or 
disproportionate under recognized principles of judicial review. 
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, unanimously on grounds (1) and (2) and 
by a majority of 4-1 on ground (3) (with Lady Hale dissenting). While the four judgments 
between the five Justices in Keyu raise a range of interesting questions of both domestic and 
international law in relation to each of the grounds, this article will focus on ground (3). 
Specifically, it will be shown how the judgment of Lord Neuberger injects novel analysis 
into the debate on substantive review. 
 
Novelty One: Classification Of Judicial Review Grounds 
 
4. The oft-cited modern classification of the grounds of judicial review²consisting of 
³LOOHJDOLW\´ ³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´ DQG ³SURFHGXUDO LPSURSULHW\´²was famously set out by Lord 
Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374 
(µ*&+4¶). Bearing this in mind, the characterization of the law of judicial review provided 
by Lord Neuberger (at para. 127) in Keyu makes for interesting reading: 
 
³The area covered by judicial review is so great that it is impossible to be exhaustive, but the normal 
principle is that an executive decision can only be overruled by a court if (i) it was made in excess of 
jurisdiction, (ii) it was effected for an improper motive, (iii) it was an irrational decision, or, as it is 
sometimes put, a decision which no rational person in the position of the decision- maker could have 
taken, or (iv) the decision-maker took into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account 
relevant matters. An attack on an executive decision based on such grounds is often known as a 
Wednesbury challenge (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 
223). If one or more of these grounds (which often overlap to some extent) is or are satisfied, the court 
may (but need not in every case) quash the decision. If none of these grounds is satisfied, then the 
decision will almost always stand.´ 
 
This may be considered a novel characterization of the law of judicial review, for two 
primary reasons. 
 
5. )LUVWZKLOHLWPD\EH³LPSRVVLEOHWREHH[KDXVWLYH´LQGHVFULELQJWKHYDVWWHUUDLQFRYHUHGE\
judicial review within the parameters of a judgment, it is difficult to understand why, for 
instance, legitimate expectations²a significant judicial innovation of recent decades²has no 
explicit place here. A further notable omission is the ground of, what Lord Diplock called, 
procedural impropriety, which is neither explicitly referenced nor implicit in the four grounds 
identified. 
 
6. 6HFRQG WKH ³VWDQGDUG´ classification of grounds of judicial review set out in GCHQ 
considers Wednesbury unreasonableness XQGHUWKHEDQQHURI³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´) as horizontally 
UHODWHG WR WKH JURXQGV RI ³LOOHJDOLW\´ DQG ³SURFHGXUDO LPSURSULHW\´ Conversely, Lord 
Neuberger appears to conceive of a vertical relationship between the grounds of judicial 
review, using ³Wednesbury challenge´ as an overarching, umbrella term, beneath which are a 
QXPEHU RI µJURXQGV¶ VXFK DV WKH GHFLVLRQ EHLQJ PDGH LQ H[Fess of jurisdiction. An 
alternative, less revolutionary, reading would be that Lord Neuberger is merely using 
³Wednesbury FKDOOHQJH´ as convenient shorthand for any judicial review challenge. 
However, this usage of the term ³Wednesbury´ as general shorthand conflicts with other 
DVSHFWV RI /RUG 1HXEHUJHU¶V RZQ MXGJPHQW ZKHUH (at para. 129) KH VWDWHV ³IRU UHDVRQV
which are individually defensible and relevant, and which cumulatively render it impossible 
to characterise their conclusion as unreasonable, let alone irrational´. As pointed out by Mark 
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Elliott, the implication here seems to be that the Wednesbury reasonableness test and 
irrationality are different,3 a position that departs from the classification of grounds in GCHQ 
and risks further contributing to the proliferation of labels for facets of substantive review 
that have emerged in recent years. 
 
Novelty Two: Rewriting GCHQ on Proportionality 
 
7. A second point of novelty arose when Lord Neuberger discussed existing judicial support for 
the introduction of proportionality as a replacement for Wednesbury unreasonableness. There 
Lord Neuberger stated (at para.  WKDW WKH ³SRVVLELOLW\ RI VXFK D FKDQJH ZDV MXGLFLDOO\
canvassed for the first time in this jurisdiction by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service 
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service´. In fact, Lord Diplock did not canvass that 
proposition at all. While Lord Diplock canvassed the potential introduction of the 
proportionality standard in that case, he did not state or even imply that this was necessarily 
to the exclusion of Wednesbury unreasonableness. In fact, a more accurate reading would be 
that proportionality was envisaged as necessarily in addition to Wednesbury. After setting out 
the three gURXQGVRI³LOOHJDOLW\´³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´DQG³SURFHGXUDOLPSURSULHW\´, he stated: 
 
³That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further 
grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 
³SURSRUWLRQDOLW\´ZKLFKLVUHFRJQLVHGLQWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZRIVHYHUDORIRXUIHOORZPHPEHUVRIWKH
European Economic Community.´ 
 
8. This is hardly a trifling point as the way in which this dictum is read has consequences that 
resonate in the substantive review debate. For instance, some commentators advocate a 
³VWUXFWXUHG´ SXEOLF ODZ DSSURDFK WR VXEVWDQWLYH UHYLHZ ZKHUH Wednesbury review sits 
alongside other standards and the different standards are applied dependent on the particular 
type of case.4 For such commentators (and many other commentators, too), this is an 
important distinction for the Supreme Court to simply gloss over. 
 
Novelty Three: Authority in Numbers 
 
9. The two points of novelty raised above pale when compared to /RUG1HXEHUJHU¶VXOWLPDWH
answer (at para. 132) to the Wednesbury/Proportionality dilemma facing the Court, which 
merits recounting in full: 
 
³,W ZRXOG QRW EH DSSURSULDWH IRU D ILYH-Justice panel of this court to accept, or indeed to reject, this 
argument, which potentially has implications which are profound in constitutional terms and very wide 
in applicable scope. Accordingly, if a proportionality challenge to the refusal to hold an inquiry would 
succeed, then it would be necessary to have this appeal (or at any rate this aspect of this appeal) reargued 
before a panel of nine Justices. However, in my opinion, such a course is unnecessary because I consider 
WKDWWKHDSSHOODQWV¶WKLUGOLQHRIDSSHDOZRXOGIDLOHYHQLILWZDVDQGFRXOGEHEDVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDOLW\´ 
 
The suggestion that it would not be appropriate for a five-Justice panel to decide this issue, 
which drew quite broad support from other members of the court, is novel at the Supreme 
                                                     
3
 0DUN (OOLRWW ³4 +RZ PDQ\ 6XSUHPH &RXUW -XVWLFHV GRHV LW WDNH WR SHUIRUP WKH :HGQHVEXU\
GRFWULQH¶V EXULDO ULWHV" $ 0RUH WKDQ ILYH´ Public Law for Everyone, 27 November 2015) 
<https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2015/11/27/q-how-many-supreme-court-justices-does-it-take-to-
perform-the-wednesbury-doctrines-burial-rites-a-more-than-five/> accessed 22 July 2016. 
4
 For instance, see Tom Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing, 2010) Ch 
9. 
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Court level. In 2003, the Court of Appeal famously said in R (Association of British Civilian 
Internees (Far East Region)) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473 (paras. 
34-35) WKDW LW ZDV QR ORQJHU DSSDUHQW ³ZKDW MXVWLILFDWLRQ WKHUH QRZ LV IRU UHWDLQLQJ WKH
Wednesbury WHVW´EXW³LWLVQRWIRUWKLVFRurt to perform its burial rites´. That demonstration 
of deference to a superior court is wholly defensible yet it is more of a stretch to characterize 
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VREYLRXVUHOXFWDQFH WRDQVZHU WKHTXHVWLRQ LQKeyu as a sincere act of 
judicial deference to higher (or more plentiful) judicial authority. 
 
10. The broader question resulting from the statement of Lord Neuberger regards the procedures 
of the Supreme Court for the allocation of Justices to cases, particularly in cases involving 
matters of great constitutional importance. Specifically, two questions arise: (1) in what 
circumstances will an enlarged panel of 7 or 9 be utilized; and 2) who makes the decision to 
utilize an enlarged panel? 
 
11. With regards to the first question, no guidance is provided in the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005 (which addresses the cognate question of when the Supreme Court will be considered 
duly constituted),5 or the Supreme Court Rules of Court and Practice Directions. However, 
guidance is identified on the Supreme Court website as follows: 
 
³Criteria to be used when considering whether more than five Justices should sit on a panel: 
 
± If the Court is being asked to depart, or may decide to depart from a previous decision. 
 
± A case of high constitutional importance. 
 
± A case of great public importance. 
 
± A case where a conflict between decisions in the House of Lords, Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council and/or the Supreme Court has to be reconciled. 
 
± A case raising an important point in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights.´6 
 
Beyond this brief statement, no further information is provided by the Court. Consequently, 
the only guidance on panel composition is provided in a statement of questionable legal status 
that is populated by undefined and somewhat vacuous terms such as ³high constitutional 
importance´DQG ³great public importance.´7 
 
12. With regards to the second question, little information is available, with no procedures 
identified in any of the aforementioned sources, including the Supreme Court website. 
However, Alan Paterson notesLQKLVVWXG\RIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWWKDWWKHSDQHOVDUH³largely 
VHOHFWHGE\WKH5HJLVWUDU´ and subsequently proposed to the President and Deputy President at 
D³horses IRUFRXUVHV´ meeting, who retain ultimate authority for approving the composition 
of each panel.8 
 
13. Considering these answers in the context of the instant case, it is apparent that nine Justices 
could have been allocated to Keyu; it is less apparent why this was not the case. It seems 
reasonably clear that Lord Neuberger considered the Wednesdbury/Proportionality question 
                                                     
5
 Sections 42-43, Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  
6
 ³3DQHO 1XPEHUV &ULWHULD´ (The Supreme Court, 2016) < 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.html> accessed 22 July 2016. 
7
 $QGUHZ%XUURZV³1XPEHUV VLWWLQJLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´>@ L.Q.R. 305. 
8
 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment (Hart Publishing, 2013) 72. 
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DVRQHRIµKLJKFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLPSRUWDQFH¶UHIOHFWHGLQKLVVWDWHPHQWWKDWDGHFLVLRQUHVROYLQJ
WKLV LVVXH µSRWHQWLDOO\ KDV LPSOLFDWLRQV ZKLFK DUH SURIRXQG LQ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO WHUPV¶ SDUD
132).  Equally, the prospect of a decision on the Wednesbury/Proportionality issue might 
satisfy further aspects of the guidance, for example if the Supreme Court was asked or 
PLQGHG WR WDNHXS WKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHG WDVNRISHUIRUPLQJ WKHµEXULDO ULWHV¶RI Wednesbury. 
Furthermore, beyond the Wednesbury/Proportionality issue, Keyu DOVR UDLVHGDQ µLPSRUWDQW
point in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights¶ QDPHO\ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI
whether, and if so how, Article 2 ECHR provides an obligation to investigate suspicious 
deaths occurring prior to the entry into force of the ECHR.  
 
Conclusion 
 
14. %H\RQG /RUG 1HXEHUJHU¶V MXGJPHQW UHDGLQJ WKH YDULHG MXGJPHQWV RI HDFK -XVWLFH LQ WXUQ
leaves an unsettling feeling: even if nine Justices would have been allocated to the case, and 
the question would have been addressed, would the answer have been clear? There is good 
reasoQWRWKLQNWKHDQVZHUZRXOGEH³QR´ as, while speaking in the language of Wednesbury 
and proportionality, it was clear that the terms each had different meanings to the different 
members of the Court. For example, Lord Neuberger stated that proportionality is distinct 
from Wednesbury in requiring the courts to consider the balance the decision-maker has 
struck between competing interests, and yet this is arguably what Lady Hale did in her 
application of Wednesbury. Unless unanimity between the Justices emerges on at least some 
of the myriad questions arising from the distinction between Wednesbury and proportionality, 
having nine Justices providing opinions on such a divisive issue may just open 3DQGRUD¶V
Box. 
 
15. ,QDQ\FDVH/RUG.HUUZKRVXSSRUWHG/RUG1HXEHUJHU¶VYLHZDFNQRZOHGJHGDWSDUD
that the question not addressed in Keyu wouOGQRWGLVDSSHDUDVDUHVXOWRIWKHMXGJPHQW³,
suspect that this question will have to be frankly addressed by this court sooner rather than 
later´. Indeed, an opportunity to consider the issue arrived soon after Keyu, in the case of 
Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3. In that 
case, the claimant argued on appeal that a decision of the Secretary of State that resulted in 
his subjection to an asset freeze by the UN Sanctions Committee should have been subject to 
µD ³IXOO PHULWV UHYLHZ´ RU DW OHDVW RQH LQYROYLQJ D ³SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ DQDO\VLV´¶ SDUD  
+RZHYHUZKLOHODWHUUHMHFWLQJWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWD³IXOOPHULWVUHYLHZ´ZDVQHFHVVDU\LQWKH
present case (para 58), therefore narrowing the issue once more to the question of 
Wednesbury/proportionality, Lord Carnwath was clear from the outset that the ultimate 
question would be deferred to another day. Citing the dicta of Lord Neuberger in Keyu that 
an enlarged court would be necessary to properly address the issue, he stated (at para 55) 
that: 
 
µ,WLVWREHKRSHGWKDWDQRSSRUWXQLW\FDQEHIRXQGLQWKHQHDUIXWXUHIRUDQDXWKRULWDWLYHUHYLHZLQWKLV
court of the judicial and academic learning on the issue, including relevant comparative material from 
other common law jurisdictions. Such a review might aim for rather more structured guidance for the 
ORZHUFRXUWVWKDQVXFKLPSUHFLVHFRQFHSWVDV³DQ[LRXVVFUXWLQ\´DQG³VOLGLQJVFDOHV´¶ 
 
If the question of substantive review is ever frankly addressed, Keyu is a decision that is 
likely to be seen, with hindsight, as representative of the conceptual confusion within the 
Courts at this time.  
